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Will Parties Take to Tahkim?: The Use of
Islamic Law and Arbitration in the United
States
Cristina Puglia
Introduction
For devout Muslims, law and religion intertwine, forming a
comprehensive system that expects compliance from Islam’s adherents.
Islamic law first emerged in countries in the Middle East, which had either
Islamic governments or a major Muslim population. In contrast to Islamic
law, the common law system that developed in the United States provides
for a clear separation of church and state. In recent times, private parties
have sought to enforce contracts governed by Islamic law in U.S. courts.
This article examines some recent cases on this issue and looks at how the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws may provide guidance to courts
and parties in future cases. It then considers whether the use of Islamic
arbitration, takhim, which already has a long and distinguished history
within Islam, may provide another mechanism for parties to have their
contracts and disputes governed by Islamic law within the United States.
In this context, this article summarizes the positive development of another
form of religious arbitration tribunals, the Jewish rabbinical arbitration
courts, the Beth din. The Beth din may serve as a valuable example for
how Islamic arbitration tribunals can develop in the United States.
Part I of this article provides an introduction to Islamic law from the
time of the Prophet Mohammad until the end of the Ottoman Empire,
describing important Islamic legal traditions and schools of thought. Part II
of this article provides examples of cases in the United States where parties
sought to use Islamic law. Part III examines the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws and its application to Islamic law. Part IV proposes a
solution to implementing Islamic law in American courts—Islamic
arbitration tribunals.
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Islamic Law: A Brief Introduction

The word "Islam" comes from the root word salam, which means
peace.1 Islam, pronounced al-Islam in Arabic, translates to “the act of
submission to God.”2 Muslims believe that God, through the archangel
Gabriel, revealed the holy book of Islam, the Qur’an, to Prophet
Mohammad.3 There are two main sources of Islamic law: the Qur’an and
the Sunnah. The Qur’an contains legal principles, which form the primary
source of Islamic law. These principles serve as a guide to Muslims on
how to act in their daily lives, in terms of moral and legal duties.4
The Sunnah,5 in turn, constitutes the second main source of Islamic
law and contains explanations of Prophet Mohammad’s acts, in which he
applied legal principles to particular cases.6 The Hadith, meaning the
Prophet’s traditions and sayings, “is the verbal report of the Sunnah of the
Prophet, which is the second primary source of Islamic legislation.”7
Three different kinds of Sunan exist:8 Sunnat al-Fi‘li, the actual
actions of Prophet Mohammad;9 Sunnat al-Qawli, the “[t]raditions enjoined
by words;”10 and Sunnat al-Ima, the actions of others approved ex post
facto, or not disapproved of, by Prophet Mohammad.11
There are also three different types of ahadith.12 The first type is
hadith qudsi, a term used for a “holy or divine hadith.”13 In a hadith qudsi,

1

S. MOSTAFA MOHAGHEGH DAMAD, PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND ISLAMIC LAWS 1 (2005) (noting that salam can be defined as “peace,
safety, well-being and health”).
2
Id. (stating that Aslama, the past tense of salm, means “he submitted”).
3
Id.
4
JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 11 (1964) (noting that Prophet Muhammad
acted as a judge of Islamic law in his community, also known as hakam); see also id. at 11-12
(indicating that some moral and legal duties listed in the Qur’an are to “arbitrate with justice, not offer
bribes, to give true evidence, and to give full weight and measure. Contracts are [also] safeguarded by
commands to put them in writing, to call witnesses, to give securities . . . when there is no scribe
available . . . or . . . to fulfill one’s contracts and, especially, to return a trust or deposit (amana) to its
ower”); see also Qur’an, sura ii. 282 f. (cf. xxiv. 33) – ii. 177; iii. 76; iv. 58; v. I; viii. 27; ix. 4, 7; xvi.
91 f.; xvii. 34; xxiii. 8; lxx. 32.
5
DAMAD, supra note 1, at 26 (relaying that the plural of Sunnah is Sunan).
6
Id. at 24-25 (noting that the traditions of the Prophet are a divine source, just as is the Qur’an).
7
SCHACHT, supra note 4, at 298 glossary (stating that the plural of hadith is ahadith); see also DAMAD,
supra note 1, at 25 (“[t]he reports of the words and deeds of the Holy Prophet are compiled in various
books of Hadith, Siyar, and Sunan, from which the science of the Sunnah is derived).
8
Id. at 26.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
DAMAD, supra note 1, at 463 (listing the three different types of ahadith as hadith qudsi, hadith
sahih, and al-hadith al-maudu‘ah).
13
Id.
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the speaker of the saying is Allah instead of Prophet Mohammad.14 The
second type is hadith sahih, a term used for a trusted tradition.15 For hadith
sahih, the origin of the hadith is not in question and does not contradict the
Qur’an.16 The third type is al-hadith al-maudu‘ah, a term used for a
fabricated hadith.17 Al-hadith al-maudu‘ah is considered forged and is
incorrectly attributed to Prophet Mohammad.18
Finally, two other important sources of Islamic law are ijma‘,
meaning consensus, and qiyas, meaning analogy.19 Ijma‘ is an “'agreement
of the Jurists among the followers of Prophet Mohammad in a particular
age on a question of law.’”20 The methodological process of ijma‘ is
murky and surrounded by disagreement. Some of these issues include the
following: the exact procedure to form ijma‘; the necessary number of
jurists; whether the vote should be majority or unanimous; whether the
reasoning should precede jurists’ decisions; and whether the jurists should
sit together when forming ijma‘.21 Some jurists use the method of qiyas,
which is defined as “pronouncing a new provision of law on the basis of
analogical deduction from the Qur’an, the Traditions of the Prophet or
some authentic report regarding the ijma‘ of the Companions of the Prophet
on the provision of law.”22 This source of law, too, is obscure and disputed
as to its nature, character, and scope.23
In addition, Islamic law has several secondary sources, including
justice, equity, good conscience, judicial decisions, and ‘urf, which means
custom.24 Pre-Islamic era customs may be implemented within the Islamic
legal system if they do not contradict the primary sources of Islamic law.25
As for justice, equity, and good conscience, they underlie the foundations
of religion and law.26 Given Islam’s wide acceptance of judicial decisions
made by the consensus (ijma') of mufti(s),27 such a decision might be
considered a judicial precedent.28

14
Id. (stating that a hadith qudsi usually refers to God, or has God speaking in the first person and the
verses are inspired directly by God, not passed down through Archangel Gabriel).
15
Id.
16
Id. (indicating that a hadith sahih, also does not contradict “well-established text[s]” of Islam).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 463.
19
Id. at 29-31.
20
Id. at 29.
21
Id. at 30.
22
Id. at 31.
23
Id. at 31.
24
Id. at 33-34.
25
See id. at 33.
26
See id. at 34.
27
Id.
28
See id.
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Islamic law is also known as Shari‘ah law.29 Shar’, which means
road, is the root of the word Shari‘ah: the “road that men and women must
follow in life.”30 Islamic law differs from other systems of jurisprudence
because its principles include an inherent sense of morality. Islamic law
guides its constituents by providing them with information on how to
handle their daily lives.31 Additionally, the way Islamic law is formed
makes it different from other jurisprudential systems. As stated previously,
Islamic law is comprised of the Qur’an and hadith as well as qiyas and
ijma‘.32 Due to the many different components of Islamic law, there exist
numerous schools of Islamic law and lines of legal reasoning; these
independent schools of thought are also known as ijtihad.33
Islamic law categorizes its laws into two groups based on individual
acts: recommended and reprehensible.34 Recommended actions, as the
name suggests, are not required, but are considered morally good.35 For
instance, helping the poor represents a recommended action.36
Reprehensible actions, in contrast, while not forbidden, are looked upon
with distaste by Allah.37 An example of such an act would be proposing to
a woman who is engaged.38
The aforementioned laws and customs developed as follows. The
two main sources of Islamic law, the Qur’an and the hadith, date back to
the time of Prophet Mohammed, 609-32 C.E.39 They provide the basic
rules and foundation for Islamic law.40 After Mohammed died in 632 C.E.,
the Islamic world entered into the reign of the four Rightly Guided
Caliphs.41 During this time period, ijma‘ and qiyas became two additional
sources of Islamic law.42 Also, a new set of rules emerged and
supplemented the body of Islamic law.43 The first rule stated that the city
of Medina, in an area now part of Saudi Arabia, would be modeled after the
29

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1 (relaying that Shari‘ah is divided into ibadat, rules for worship, and mu’amilat, rules for
transactions).
31
See id. at 3 (giving an example of how the Qur’an encourages people to fulfill contracts because it is
their moral duty; an unfulfilled contract equates to disbelief in Islam).
32
See id. at 4.
33
See id. (listing differences in Ijtihad between Sunni and Shia Muslims.)
34
Id. at 5.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 5.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See id. at 8-9.
40
Id. at 9.
41
See id. at 9-10 (noting that this period lasted from 632-62 A.D., and during this time the Caliphate
passed from Abu Bakr, to ‘Umar, to Uthamn, and finally to Ali).
42
See id. at 10.
43
Id.
30
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Persian administrative system.44 The second one asserted that temporary
marriage would be abolished as well as a “certain type of pilgrimage to
Mecca that had been permitted at the time of the Holy Prophet.”45 Sunnis
accepted this decree, but the minority Shias rejected it.46
From 622-794 C.E., the Umayyad Dynasty held the caliphate.47
During this period, the office of qadi(s) became the administration of
justice and the “office of the clerk of the court” also known as the sherif.48
Throughout this time, the Umayyads spread misrepresentations of the
Prophet’s sayings as a way to gain their constituents’ support.49 These
falsehoods led Muslims to seek the help of Islamic legal scholars, who
were recognized as independent and wise individuals.50 These Islamic
scholars are known as mufti(s).51
The next significant period of Islamic legal development occurred
during the Abbasid era, 745-1272 C.E.52 During this period, the Office of
Chief Justice, or Qadi-al-qudat, was established.53 The Chief Justice acted
as legal advisor to the caliph with the sole right to appoint and dismiss
judges.54 A police force, or shurtah, was also created.55 Furthermore, the
Abbasids created a court of grievances, or al-nazar fi al-mazalim, which
reviewed the jurists’ opinions and ensured their compliance with Islamic
law and justice.56 Abbasids also attempted to compile the traditions of the
Holy Prophet.57
Throughout history, scholars gathered the hadith into several
different books, including the most famous ones: Sahih-i-Bukhari, Sahih-iMuslim, Sahih-i-Tirmadhi, Sahih-i-Nisayi, Sahih-i-sajastani, and Sahih-iibn majeh.58 Shi‘ite scholars compiled their own books, such as al-Kafi,
Man-la-yahduruhul-al-faqih, Kitab al-Tahdhib, and Kitab al-Istirbsar.59

44

Id.
Id.
46
Id.
47
See id. at 10-11 (stating that Mu‘awiyah was the first Caliph under the Umayyad Dynasty, which held
great power for more than 80 years but ultimately crumbled after a civil war in 794 A.D.).
48
Id. at 11 (noting that Mohammad acted as a judge during his lifetime; the Caliphs also acted as judges
but additionally appointed other judges in major cities).
49
See id. at 12.
50
See id.
51
Id. at 13.
52
See id.
53
Id. at 14.
54
Id. at 14.
55
Id.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
See id. at 15.
59
Id.
45

No. 2

Will Parties Take to Takhim?

157

During 1283-1923 C.E., the Ottoman Empire established the office
of Grand Mufti and codified the Islamic law.60 Thereafter, the secular
courts adjudicated commercial and trade disputes while the Shari‘ah courts
resolved all other issues.61 Ottoman caliphs codified Islamic law62 in an
1850 commercial code and an 1877 civil code.63
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic countries began a
process of modernization in line with the European legal system.64
However, they did not want to trade Islamic law for European law.65 This
modernization, though it did not affect religious rituals or personal status
laws, modified some areas like commercial and tax law.66 Certain
countries still chose to follow “Traditional Islamic Law.”67
Each school of Islamic law solves legal issues in a different
manner.68 The main schools of Islamic law among the Sunnis include
Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali. The Shi‘ite and Khawarij also have
several non-official schools of law.69 The Hanafi school famously places
more importance on qiyas to solve legal issues rather than on the traditions
of the Prophet.70 The Maliki school focuses on the traditions of the
Prophet, along with “the rule of discretion (Istislah).”71 The Maliki school
also relies on the practices of the people from Medina, dating back to the
time of the Prophet and the school’s founder, Malik Ibn Anas.72 The Shafi’i
school supports the traditions of the Prophet, qiyas, and istislah, but
opposes preference (istihsan).73 The Hanbali school focuses first on the
Qur’an, and then on the traditions of the Prophet.74 Out of all the schools,
the Hanbali school places the most importance on the traditions of the
Prophet.75

60

Id. at 463.
See id. at 16.
62
Id. (relaying that this reformation is referred to as Tanzimat).
63
Id. (indicating that the civil code was known as Majallah-al-Ahkam-al-‘Adliyah).
64
See id. at 17.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 18.
68
See id. at 18.
69
See id.
70
See id.
71
See id. at 19.
72
See id.
73
See id.
74
See id. at 20.
75
See id.
61
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Islamic Law in American Courts

As seen above, Islam is not only a religion, but also a jurisprudential
system dating back to the time of the Prophet Mohammed, 609-632 C.E. It
is one of the most important legal regimes in the world today. The cases
discussed below serve as examples of how Islamic law, as a choice of law
in private contracts, has been handled in the United States legal system.
A.

Awad v. Ziriax

In 2010, Oklahoma voters sought to amend their state constitution,
and on November 2, 2010, State Question 755 was adopted.76 State
Question 755, also known as the “Save Our State Amendment,”77 would
amend Article 7, Section 1 of the Oklahoma State Constitution to include a
provision stating:
The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section,
when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and
adhere to the law as provided in the United States
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States
Code, the federal regulation promulgated pursuant thereto,
established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules
promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of
another state of the United States provided the law of the
other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial
decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of
other nations or cultures. Specifically the courts shall not
consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions
of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the
76
See Penny M. Venetis, The Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma’s SQ 755 and Other Provisions Like it
that Bar State Courts From Considering International Law, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189, 189 (2011)
(stating that on November 2, 2010, by a 70.08 percent majority, Oklahoma voters adopted State
Question 755); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2012). [hereinafter
Awad 1] (“State Question No. 755, which was on Oklahoma’s November 2, 2010 ballot, provides: This
measure amends the State Constitution. It changes a section that deals with the courts of this state. It
would amend article VII, section 1. It makes courts rely on federal and state law when deciding cases.
It forbids courts from considering or using international law. It forbids courts from considering or using
Sharia law. International law is also known as the law of nations. It deals with the conduct of
international organizations and independent nations, such as countries, states and tribes. It deals with
their relationship with each other. It also deals with some of their relationships with persons. The law
of nations is formed by the general assent of civilized nations. Sources of international law also include
international agreements, as well as treaties. Sharia law is Islamic law. It is based on two principal
sources, the Koran and the teaching of Mohammed.”).
77
See Okla. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (calling section C of the Oklahoma Constitution the “Save Our State
Amendment”).
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respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first
impression.78
On November 4, 2010, a Muslim American, Muneer Awad filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Oklahoma
(the “District of Oklahoma”) seeking a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to prevent the results of the November 2, 2010
election from being certified and thereby taking effect.79 Awad was the
Executive Director of the Council on American Islamic Relations,
Oklahoma Branch.80 The defendant in the action was the Board of
Elections for Oklahoma.81 Awad challenged the constitutionality of State
Question 755, asserting that a prohibition from considering Sharia law
violates the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.82
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment say
that “[C]ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”83 State Question 755 only
mentions Sharia law, and no other religion or religious law.
78
See Okla. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see also Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2012)
(No. 5:10-CV-01186) (indicating that the Amendment’s text prohibits state courts from applying other
state court laws, if these laws include Sharia law, and from considering Sharia law themselves); see
also CHARLES LE GAI EATON, ISLAM AND THE DESTINY OF MAN 166 (1985) (defining the word Sharia
as “‘road or highway[,]’” referring to a road wild animals walk down to drink from—‘the road which
leads to where the waters of life flow inexhaustibly.’”); id. at 167 (stating that the Qur’anic message
and Prophet Mohammed’s example form Sharia law, a body of living law, which proscribes guidance
for Muslims on how to live together, is not solely revealed law, but is made also from the sayings and
actions of Mohammed, which form the hadiths); DAMAD, supra note 1, at 2 (defining Sharia as the
“road men and women must follow in life” and Sharia law as divided into two sections, ‘ibadat and
mu’amilat. ‘Ibadat concerns worship and mu’amilat concerns transactions, such as economic or social,
or wills in the case of Awad).
79
See Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1305; see also Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10CV-01186) (indicating the urgency with which the temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction were needed, because the State Board of Elections was scheduled to certify State Question
755’s results on November 9, 2010).
80
See Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10-CV-01186) (listing information about
plaintiff, including that he defends Muslims’ civil rights in his capacity as Executive Director of the
Council on American Islamic Relations and relaying that State Question 755’s supporters have
described it as a “preemptive strike” against morals that threaten “Oklahoma’s Judeo-Christian
values”); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the First
Amendment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 369 (2011) (stating that under the proposed Oklahoma
Amendment, a contract for kosher meat will be enforced, while a contract for halal meat will not).
81
See Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10-CV-01186) (listing defendants as the entire
Board for Oklahoma’s State Board of Elections, and specifying Paul Ziriax, Agency Head for
Oklahoma’s State Board of Elections, who has control over their operations, and Thomas Prince and
Susan Turpen, board members with the legal authority to vote to certify an election).
82
See Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
83
See U.S. CONST. ART. I.
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Awad argued that if the election results were certified, his First
Amendment rights would be violated.84 The violation would flow from
condemnation of his religion by banning Sharia law,85 because his last will
and testament, which incorporates aspects of Sharia law, would be
invalidated.86 Awad’s last will and testament contained instructions for
charitable distribution of his assets, which is a principle drawn from a
teaching of Mohammed.87 Since State Question 755 would consider a
teaching of Mohammed to be Sharia law, an Oklahoma court would have
to consider Sharia law to distribute his assets.88 Thus, State Question 755
would prohibit an Oklahoma court from probating Awad’s last will and
testament.
Awad contended that state courts would violate the First Amendment
by becoming entangled with religion when trying to figure out what
qualifies as Sharia law.89 He presented testimony to show that Sharia law
is a religious tradition and not actual law.90 He argued that Sharia law
imposes personal obligations based on faith, not legal obligations, and that
the content of Sharia law differs by country.91 Sharia law, he further
argued, directs Muslims to abide by the law of the land, so, for example,
although in polygamy is permissible in Islam, it is not in the United States,
84
See Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1; See also, Complaint, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (noting that
once Thomas Prince and Susan Turpen certify the results of the election, the results will have legal
effect).
85
See Complaint at 6, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10-CV-01186) (stating that certification of
the election results will equal state disapproval of plaintiff’s faith, the ban on Sharia law implies there is
something “nefarious about the Koran” and Mohammed’s teachings, the excessive entanglement with
religion that certification of the results will lead to, is in violation of what the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment stands to protect); see also Domke on Commercial Arbitration, Part XVI.
Interaction of Arbitration with Specialized Fields in the law, § 54:10. Particular issues in the
Abrahamic/Mosaic religions—Islam, 2 DOMKE ON COM. ARB. § 54:10 (relaying that both Mohammed
and Moses, considered great lawmakers, are depicted in a freeze within the United States Supreme
Court, but this equality in depiction is not mirrored by equality in perception of the American public,
where Jewish laws are generally cited positively, and Islamic laws are viewed as “primitive and
unpredictable”).
86
Complaint at 7, Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (No. 5:10-CV-01186) (indicating that plaintiff’s
validly executed last will and testament directs his affairs to be handled in accordance with Sharia law,
and even goes so far as to direct the testator to Qur’anic verses containing instructions for the purposes
of executing a last will and testament in accordance with Islamic tradition; plaintiff argues that this
validly executed will can no longer be considered in Oklahoma because it implicates and would require
a judge to “consider” Sharia law. Plaintiff’s uncertainty about when he will die and what will happen
to his estate when in probate creates an immediate injury. Lastly, for any will to be enforceable, it must
eliminate any reference to his religion, which includes guidance for important matters such as
inheritance and burial instructions.).
87
Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.
88
Id.
89
See id. at 1301-02 (describing plaintiff’s religion, Islam, as relying on the Qur’an and Prophet
Mohammed, and as providing the principles that guide plaintiff for every action he makes in his
business or personal life).
90
Id. at 1306.
91
Id.
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and thus Muslims in the U.S. do not engage in polygamy.92 The District of
Oklahoma found that Sharia law “lacks a legal character and, thus,
plaintiff’s religious traditions and faith are the only non-legal content
subject to the judicial exclusion set forth in the amendment.”93 Thus, it
found that State Question 755 inhibited plaintiff’s religion by disapproving
of Islam.94 Also, because the court found that Sharia law was, in fact, not
law, it further held that State Question 755 would lead to excessive
government entanglement with religion, in violation of the First
Amendment, because Oklahoma courts would have to determine the
content of Sharia law, meaning the content of plaintiff’s religion.95
In sum, Awad argued that the amendment violated the Establishment
Clause by singling out the Muslim faith, requiring state courts to become
unnecessarily entangled in religion, and disapproving of his religion.96
There is not a single text that all Muslims regard as making up Sharia law,
and so the state courts would have to examine many different religious
texts to determine what texts will count as Sharia law.97 Awad further
asserted that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment had been
violated because the amendment discriminates against his religion, and
fails strict scrutiny because it has no “compelling interest and is not
narrowly tailored.”98
The court determined that Awad had standing to bring his action and
that he made a “preliminary showing that he will suffer an injury in fact,”99
and granted a temporary restraining order and enjoined the defendants from
certifying the election results.100
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 1306-1307
96
Id. at 3 (“In support, plaintiff cites to one of the authors of State Question 755, Representative Rex
Duncan’s statement that ‘America was founded on Judeo-Christian principles’ and the amendment’s
purpose was to ensure that Oklahoma’s courts are not used to ‘undermine those founding principles,’
and Representative Duncan’s further statement that the purpose of the measure was to establish a legal
impediment against the ‘looming threat’ of Sharia law in the United States.”).
97
Id.; see also, DAMAD, supra note 1, at 1-2 (noting that the Qur’an has approximately 6000 verses,
approximately 200 of which deal with law, approximately 80 of which deal with personal status laws.
Personal status laws concern issues of family law, such as inheritance and marriage. These laws are
interwoven throughout the Qur’anic chapters that were revealed to Mohammed in Medina, as opposed
to those chapters revealed in Mecca); DAMAD, supra note 1, at 4 (listing the main sources of Islamic
law as the Qur’an, the hadiths (traditions and sayings of the prophet), “reasoning by analogy (qiyas),
and “the consensus of the Islamic jurists or Ijma‘.” The qiyas and Ijma‘ answer legal issues through
interpretation and the Qur’an and hadiths); id. at 19-21 (listing the schools of Islamic Law as the Hanafi
School, Maliki School, Shafi’i School, Hanbali School, Shi‘ite School, Zaidis, Imamiyah, and
Ismal‘liyah).
98
Awad 1, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
99
Id. at 2.
100
Id. at 4.
93
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Following the November 9, 2010 decision granting the temporary
restraining order and enjoining the defendants from certifying the election
results,101 the District Court in Oklahoma found, after reviewing the briefs
and hearing arguments, that Awad would suffer an injury in fact—a
violation of his First Amendment rights.102 The court even went on to say,
with strong language, that “it would be incomprehensible if, as Plaintiff
alleges, Oklahoma could condemn the religion of its Muslim citizens, yet
one of those citizens could not defend himself in court against his
government’s preferment of other religious views.”103 The court also
agreed with the plaintiff that because of the ban on considering Sharia law,
Oklahoma courts would not be able to probate his will, which would make
his will unenforceable.104 It granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the
Oklahoma State Board of Elections from certifying the election results until
it could rule on the merits of Awad’s claims.105
The Oklahoma State Board of Elections appealed the case to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (the “Tenth
Circuit”).106 The Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the District Court of
Oklahoma abused its discretion when granting the preliminary
injunction.107 It held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the preliminary injunction and noted that the Plaintiff made a
“strong showing on the substantial likelihood and balance-of-harms factors
as the heightened standard requires.”108 As the case stands now, the Board
of Elections for Oklahoma can file a petition to have the case reheard,109 or
the Solicitor General for Oklahoma can file for certiorari in the U.S.
Supreme Court.110
Although the District Court in Awad v. Ziriax invalidated the ban on
Sharia law, the ruling was based on constitutional issues and is not wholly
101

Id. at 4.
See id. at 1304.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1308.
106
See generally Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir.2012) [hereinafter Awad 2] (noting that
the Board members asked for the case to be reviewed).
107
Id. at 1116.
108
Id. at 1132; Awad 2, 670 F.3d at 1129 (stating that under the Larson Test, which was applied to the
Establishment Clause, “Appellants must show (1) a compelling government interest, and (2) that the
amendment is “closely fitted” to that compelling interest” and the State of Oklahoma lacked a
compelling state interest necessary to survive this test).
109
Awad 2, 670 F.3d at 1116 (indicating that Awad v. Ziriax was heard before Judges O’Brien, McKay,
and Matheson, not the entire panel of 10th circuit judges, so Wyrick, the Solicitor General for Oklahoma
can file an appeal to have the case reheard en banc).
110
Ismael T. Salam, “Save Our State” Amendment: Dead on Arrival, 17 PUB. INT. L. REP. 35, 41 (2011)
(relaying that as of the time of the writing of this article, the Tenth Circuit had not yet rendered an
opinion, however, as of the time of the writing of this Paper, the Tenth Circuit has rendered an opinion,
but there has been no further action on the case).
102
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indicative of a favorable view of Islamic law as a choice of law in the
United States. Similar proposals to the “Save Our State Amendment” have
been considered in other states.111 The South Carolina Legislature
proposed a very similar bill, which also mentioned Sharia law
specifically.112 Arizona introduced a resolution prohibiting international
law, which went so far as to declare that a judicial decision violating the
ban on international law is grounds for impeachment and removal of the
deciding judge.113
B.

In re Marriage of Ahmad and Sherifa Shaban v. Sherifa Shaban

Marriage of Shaban v. Shaban involved a prenuptial agreement,
which appeared to be governed by Islamic law. The Shabans married in
Egypt and subsequently lived in the United States for 17 years before
deciding to divorce.114 Prior to their marriage, a prenuptial agreement was
executed.115 The agreement was written in Arabic and signed by Mr.
Shaban and his father-in-law.116 There were three English translations of
the document, but according to the California Fourth District Court of
Appeal (“Court of Appeal”), only the dowry arrangement “set forth any
substantive matter.”117 At trial, an expert witness was prepared to testify
that the parties' intended to have their marriage governed by Islamic law,
including property division, based on the language of the document.118
Introducing the expert witness invoked the parol evidence rule.119 The
agreement stated that the marriage is a “[l]egal marriage concluded in
111
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual
Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 320 (2011).
112
Id. (“The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the
courts shall not consider Sharia law, international law, the constitutions, laws, rules, regulations, and
decisions of courts or tribunals of other nations, or conventions, or treaties whether or not the United
States is a party.”).
113
Id. (Text of Arizona resolution) (“[Arizona] ‘shall not use, implement, refer to or incorporate any
case law or statute from another country or a foreign body or jurisdiction that is outside of the United
States’ . . . [any judicial decision that violates this proscription is ‘null and void . . . and is grounds for
impeachment and removal from office’ of the deciding judge.’”).
114
Marriage of Shaban v. Shaban, 88 Cal. App. 4th 398, 400 (2001).
115
Id. at 400-401.
116
Id. at 401 (relaying that the bride’s father had signed the agreement on her behalf as her
“‘representative’”).
117
Id.; see also id. at 401, n.1 (text from the prenuptial agreement) (“[t]he above legal marriage has
been concluded in accordance with his Almighty God’s Holy Book and the Rules of his Prophet to
whom all God’s prayers and blessings be, by legal offer and acceptance from the two contracting
parties. The foregoing was concluded after the two parties had taken cognizance of the legal
implications and after ascertaining that there are no legal or formal impediments preventing their
marriage, and that the bride does not receive any salary from the Government and does not possess any
funds exceeding L.E. 200, and that the bride and the bridegroom are of age.”).
118
Id. at 401.
119
Id.
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Accordance with God’s Book and the precepts of His Prophet and with the
mutual agreement of the husband and the wife’s representative [and that
the] two parties . . . [have] taken cognizance of the legal implications [of
the agreement].”120 Mr. Shaban asserted that this text referencing God
indicates the parties’ intention to have their marriage governed by “‘Islamic
law.’”121
California community property law provides that acquisitions of
property during a marriage become community property and should be
divided among the parties.122 Conversely, Islamic law provides that
property accumulated during a marriage, including earnings, remain the
property of the person who purchased or earned the property.123 For the
Shabans, the result of applying Islamic law would have meant that Mrs.
Shaban would have no interest in Mr. Shaban’s medical practice or
retirement accounts, but their real property, jointly held in both of their
names, would be equally divided.124
The Islamic law expert was not allowed to testify because the trial
court judge concluded that the alleged prenuptial agreement was in
actuality a marriage certificate, and California community property law
was applied.125 Mr. Shaban appealed the trial court’s ruling, arguing that
the Islamic law expert should have been allowed to testify.126 The Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court decision.127 The court engaged in a lengthy
discussion about the distinctions between the parol evidence rule and the
Statute of Frauds,128 concluding that “there [was] no reason the same
requirement that the writing evidence[,] with reasonable certainty[,] . . .
should not also apply to prenuptial agreements.”129 It reasoned that the
policy considerations supporting the Statute of Frauds were of the utmost
importance when dealing with prenuptial agreements, because of the
emotional impact of divorce, the triggering of prenuptial agreements, and
the temptation for “selective memory” in divorce cases.130 The court stated
that regardless of the parties’ desire to be regulated under Islamic law,131
120

Id. at 403.
Id. at 403-404.
122
Id. at 404.
123
See id.
124
See id.
125
See id.
126
Id. (stating that Mr. Shaban did note that if California law were found to govern, then the division of
property as laid down by the trial court was correct).
127
Id. at 411.
128
See id. at 404-407.
129
Id. at 406.
130
Id.
131
See id. at 406-407 (stating that the evidence for this desire is found in the term of their contract
saying “in Accordance with his Almighty God’s Holy Book and the rules of this Prophet’ and ‘two
parties [having] taken cognizance of the legal implications”).
121
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the contract terms indicating such a desire had too weak a relationship to a
prenuptial agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. It declined to rule on
whether the alleged prenuptial agreement was against public policy,
because the trial court did not err in excluding the parol evidence rule.132
In the Shaban case, the Court of Appeal determined that applying
Islamic law would be too abstract, and did not discuss whether the
application of Islamic law in the Shabans’ case would be contrary to public
policy.133 The court stated that it would be acceptable for a couple to
choose a system of law to govern their prenuptial agreement, but found that
choosing Islamic law would be equivalent to “[putting together a contract]
without any agreement as to basic terms, [and agreeing] that a marriage
will simply be governed by a given system of law and then hop[ing] that
parol evidence will supply those basic terms.”134 The practical effect of the
court’s holding in this case is a suggestion that Islamic law is too vague to
be applied in the courts.
C.

El-Farra v. Sayyed

El-Farra v. Sayyed is an example of a case where the court declined
to enforce an employment agreement governed by Islamic law. The
Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court had subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the claims of Monir El-Farra.135 El-Farra was
the Imam at the Islamic Center of Little Rock (“ICLR”).136 His
employment contract stated that the ICLR could terminate his employment
through a unanimous vote “on valid grounds according to Islamic
Jurisdiction (Shari‘a).”137 El-Farra’s sermons were found to be offensive to
members of the congregation, and on May 15, 2003, the ICLR sent him a
letter saying his actions created “‘disunity and ‘fitna’138 among the
community[.]’”139 The letter further warned El-Farra that if he did not
improve, he would be terminated.140 On May 30, 2003, the ICLR sent El-

132

Id. at 403.
Id. at 407.
134
See id.
135
El-Farra v. Sayyed, 365 Ark. 209, 210 (2006).
136
Id. at 211.
137
Id. (relaying that the Executive Committee and Board of Directions of the Islamic Center must have
a unanimous vote to terminate his employment).
138
ABOUT.COM, http://islam.about.com/od/glossary/g/fitna.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (“forces that
cause controversy, fragmentation, scandal, chaos, or discord within the Muslim community, disturbing
social peace and order.”).
139
El-Farra, 365 Ark. at 211.
140
Id.
133
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Farra another letter, stating his actions were in “contradict[ion] with
Islamic law.”141 El-Farra was eventually terminated on July 17, 2003.142
After his termination, El-Farra filed a complaint against the ICLR
alleging defamation, tortious interference with a contract, and breach of a
contract. The ICLR responded by arguing that under the First Amendment,
the court could not hear the case and summary judgment should be
granted.143 The circuit court stated that it could not hear El-Farra’s claims
because doing so would be akin to a civil court placing limitations on
individuals that religious institutions can choose as their representatives,
which would violate the First Amendment.144 El-Farra claimed there was a
breach of his contract,145 and the terms of his contract provided that he
could be terminated “‘on valid grounds according to Islamic Jurisdiction
(Shari‘a).’”146 The court found that any determination of El-Farra’s claim
would involve intertwining itself in ecclesiastical issues, which would
violate the First Amendment, and therefore, El-Farra was left without any
remedy because the court would not look at Sharia law.147
El-Farra also asserted a claim for defamation, based on what the
letters sent to him by the Islamic Center claimed.148 To make a
determination on whether the Islamic Center is guilty of defaming ElFarra,149 the court would have to delve into Islamic law, which it claimed
would be a violation of the First Amendment.150 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas affirmed the lower court’s ruling, which held that there was
insufficient subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.151
The El-Farra case demonstrates a situation where the parties chose
to have their contract governed by Islamic law, but the courts did not view
Islamic law as a valid choice of law and therefore did not honor this choice.
141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 212.
145
Id. at 211.
146
Id.
147
See id. at 214-215 (“the First Amendment protects the act of decision rather than the motivation
behind it; therefore, whether the termination of appellant was based on secular reasons or Islamic
doctrine, this court will not involve itself in ICLR’s right to choose ministers without government
interference.”).
148
Id. at 211; see also id. at 215-216 (recounting that the letters sent by the Islamic Center to El-Farra
accused him of “‘insubordination, disrespect, and lack of cooperation,’ of being ‘disruptive, to the
community,’ of delivering khutbas (sermons) which showed ‘maleficence and deliberate interference in
the operations of the EC,’ and of ‘creating disunity and ‘fitna’ among the community,’ . . . [and] of
conduct which ‘contradicts the Islamic law,’ and of conduct which has ‘increasingly been unbecoming,
insubordinate and disrespectful to the entire community.’”).
149
Id. at 216 (indicating that to determine whether El-Farra has contradicted Islamic law, or is guilty of
creating fitna in the community, the court will have to delve into interpret Islamic law).
150
See id. at 216.
151
See id. at 214.
142
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National Group for Communications & Computers v. Lucent
Technologies International

In Nat’l Grp. for Commc’ns & Computers v. Lucent Techs. Int’l,
National Group for Communications and Computers Ltd. (“NGC”) sued
Lucent Technologies International, Inc. (“Lucent”) over a
telecommunications construction subcontract.152 American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (“AT&T”), the corporate predecessor of Lucent, had
entered into a subcontract with the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Post
Telephone and Telegraph.153 The contract provided for a four-year
relationship.154 The project, however, never came to fruition and the
subcontract was ultimately terminated.155 The case concerned the proper
award of damages under Saudi Arabian law for a breach of contract
claim.156 Both parties chose Saudi Arabian law to apply, using the
following language: “This Subcontract is subject to the regulations in force
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Interpretation and execution of the
Subcontract and settlement of claims arising therefrom shall be subject to
and in accordance with the said regulations.”157 Due to the choice-of-law
provision, the New Jersey District Court had to determine the case under
Saudi Arabian law.158 The court had jurisdiction to do this pursuant to Rule
44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that when
deciding issues of foreign law, a court ‘“may consider any relevant material
or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”159

152
Nat’l Grp. for Commc’n & Computers v. Lucent Tech. Int’l, 331 F. Supp. 2d 290, 292 (D. N.J.
2004).
153
Id.
154
Id. (stating that “[p]laintiff was to implement the Roadside Emergency Telephone and Wayside
Facilities Project (“RET/WSF Projects”) in Saudi Arabia by performing design and engineering
services and installing emergency and pay telephones along Saudi Arabia’s highways and nearby
facilities.”).
155
Id.
156
Id.. (noting that the parties agreed and the Court “assume[d]” that the subcontract was breached, and
so the findings of fact only concerned damages under Saudi Arabian law); See also Charles P.
Trumbull, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV.
609, 635 (2006) (noting that Saudi Arabia has adopted the classical, un-codified, Islamic law).
157
Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
158
Id..
159
Id. at 293-294 (explaining that in making the determination on foreign law, courts may conduct its
own research, request additional information from the parties, use experts and foreign material, and may
even consider evidence that would be inadmissible at trial).
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The court then analyzed Sharia law nonetheless.160 Saudi Arabia
applies classic Islamic law, whereas other countries may only apply a few
tenets of the faith and jurisprudential system.161 In applying Saudi Arabian
law, the court examined various sources of the law; consulted Islamic law
scholars; noted the infusion of Islam into the life of Saudi Arabian citizens;
and acknowledged that Islamic law controls Saudi Arabia’s legal system.162
The court then highlighted several ways in which the Saudi Arabian legal
system differs from that of the United States.163 Importantly, there is no
judicial precedent to bind judges and the opinions are not published in
Saudi Arabia.164 In fact, judges in Saudi Arabia “‘must strive for the divine
truth for each case that confronts him, without being bound by past
opinions, even his own. Truth is the ultimate precedent, to which one must
return once it is revealed.”165
Under Islamic law, it is difficult to conduct some business
transactions because of the prohibition of gharar,166 and as such, clients
engaging in complex business transactions are often encouraged to exclude
Sharia law as a choice of law.167 Here, the court determined that the parties
were sophisticated in business and Islamic law. Because they chose not to
expressly exclude Sharia law in their contract, the court found it applied,
noting “however uncompromising that application may be.”168 After
finding Sharia law governed, the court then applied Saudi Arabian damages
law to the case and determined that the damages plaintiff sought were
contrary to Islamic law due to gharar.169 The court ultimately decided that
160

Id..
See id. at 295.
Id. at 294 (citing sections from the Basic Regulation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia quoted by the
Court) (“Article 1: The religion [of Saudi Arabia] is Islam, its constitution is the Book of God Most
High and the Sunna of His Prophet, may God bless him and give him peace. Article 7: Rule in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia draws its authority from the Book of God Most High and the Sunna of His
Prophet. These two are sovereign over this Regulation and all regulations of the state. Article 48: The
courts shall apply in cases brought before them the rules of the Islamic shari’a in agreement with the
indications in the Book and the Sunna and the regulations issued by the ruler that do not contradict the
Book or the Sunna.”).
163
Id. at 295-297.
164
See id. at 295.
165
See id.; see also Trumbull, supra note 156, at 633-634 (stating that one of the reasons that Islamic
law is harder to apply than Christian or Jewish law is because there is no authoritative text on Islamic
law and expert witnesses cannot testify to a binding interpretation of Islamic law, unless an ijma has
been reached, and since there are many schools of Islamic thought, adopting one over the other will
likely prove unconstitutional).
166
See Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (indicating that gharar, meaning risk, is prohibited and repugnant
in Islam and the practical result is that courts in Saudi Arabia will not enforce uncertain or unknown
sales); see also Trumbull, supra note 156, at 633-634 (noting that this prohibition comes from the
hadith).
167
See Trumbull, supra note 156, at 633-634
168
Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
169
Id. at 298.
161
162
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when applying Saudi Arabian law, looking at Islamic law texts, considering
expert testimony, and examining Islamic law, it could not award damages
to the plaintiff.170
The Lucent decision indicates that there are situations where U.S.
courts can and will apply Islamic law.171 Thus, despite arguments that this
jurisprudential system is overly vague, U.S. courts are capable of
understanding and applying Islamic law.172 In Lucent, both parties
contracted for Saudi Arabian law to apply.173 As such, the court reasoned
that it had to determine the case under this law, which required it to analyze
Islamic law.174 According to Saudi Arabian law, in a claim for breach of
contract, a plaintiff can only recover for the “actual physical harm to the
property caused by the breach as well as out-of-pocket losses, and can be
obtained only for losses which are precise, accurate and certain.”175
Although it has been suggested that the Lucent case violates the First
Amendment, no appeal has been filed to date.176 Some scholars argue that,
to decide this case, the court had to make a determination of religious
doctrine concerning gharar. But since Saudi Arabian law is not codified, it
could not make this determination based on a secular footing.177 The judge,
some argue, played the role of qadi and rejected the plaintiff’s argument for
lack of “‘supporting religious authority.’”178
III.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws

There are constitutional and public policy issues with respect to
applying Islamic law in the United States. The First Amendment provides
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.”179 Critics of Islamic law fear
that if it were allowed as a choice of law in the U.S. judicial system, the
courts would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.180
Another concern is that if Islamic law were applied in the arbitration
170

Id. at 301.
See Julio C. Colon, Choice of Law and Islamic Finance, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 429 (2011).
172
See Symeonides, supra note 111, at 430.
173
Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
174
See Colon, supra note 171, at 429.
175
See Lucent, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 297 (indicating that under Saudi Arabian law, a party actually cannot
assume the risk of gharar).
176
See Symeonides, supra note 111, at 430; see also Trumbull, supra note 156, at 634.
177
See Trumbull, supra note 156, at 636.
178
See id.
179
U.S. CONST. art. I.
180
See Colon, supra note 171, at 427.
171
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setting, the resulting arbitral awards may be vacated in court on public
policy grounds.181 There are, however, some legal sources available to
assist courts tasked with these complicated choice-of-law situations,
including applying Islamic law, which should allay such fears. The
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement”) is the main
source.182
The Restatement recognizes in its first section that issues arise that
may implicate the laws of two separate states, and that these states may
have conflicting laws, which makes it necessary to have a way to organize
both sets of laws and come to a resolution.183 Section 6 of the Restatement
provides guidelines for choice-of-law principles.184 Specifically, Section 6
provides that, inter alia, when a state does not have its own statutory
directive to follow on choice of law, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule include: 1) international and interstate system needs; 2)
relevant policies of the forum; 3) relevant policies and interests of other
interested states in the determination of the particular issue; 4) protection of
justified expectations; 5) basic policies underlying the particular field of
law; 6) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and 7) ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.185 The comments to
this section note that the protection of justified expectations is an important
tenet of choice of law rules.186 Where parties have chosen a particular type
of law, such as Islamic law, and are expecting to be bound by that law, it is
unfair to “hold a person liable under the local law of one state when he had
justifiably molded his conduct to conform to the requirements of another
state.”187 Of course this tenet does not apply when the individual has
molded his conduct to conform to the laws of another state whereby such
conduct is contrary to public policy. However, where the parties choose
Islamic law and there is no public policy issue, there is no reason that
Islamic law should not be applied, such as in a contract case.
Another important factor emphasized by Section 6 is the
understanding of the basic policies behind a given law.188 Some courts
have argued that Islamic law is vague and unpredictable because of the
different schools of legal thought.189 Yet given the number of cases where
181
See id. (noting that there have been instances in arbitration of Islamic finance where a challenge of
the award was attached on First Amendment grounds).
182
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
183
See id.
184
Id. at § 6.
185
Id.
186
Id. at § 6 cmt. g.
187
Colon, supra note 171, at § 6 cmt. g.
188
Id. at § 6 cmt. h.
189
See, e.g., Marriage of Shaban v. Shaban, 88 Cal. App. 4th 398, 400 (2001).
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courts have successfully applied Islamic law,190 it is clear that concerns of
adequately understanding Islamic law should not be a bar in selecting it as
a choice of law.
The Restatement also addresses which law is to govern in the
absence of effective choice by the parties.191 This Section applies to
Islamic law, where parties choose to apply Islamic law generally, but fail to
indicate which school of thought they planned to follow. Section 188 holds
that where the parties have not made an effective choice of law, the
“contacts to be taken into account in applying principles of Section 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place of
contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of
performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e)
the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.”192 The effect of this section on the choice of law,
including Islamic law, is that where parties intend to be bound by Islamic
law but are silent on the school of thought of such law, courts can “fill in
the gap” by using the above factors to determine which school of thought is
to apply. Of course, applying Section 188 will not work in every case
where Islamic law is said to govern, or when some contract terms are
substantially unclear. Although, if courts at least attempted to apply
Islamic law, it is likely that some parties contracting for Islamic law would
be successful in having this choice of law provision upheld, rather than the
case being dismissed.
Section 187 of the Restatement concerns the law of the state chosen
by the parties.193 Generally, it provides that if parties have chosen a
particular law to apply, then courts should apply that law. Further, even if
parties have not indicated what law they want to apply, but have inserted
terms in their contract that lead the court to conclude that the parties
intended a particular law to apply, the court can apply that particular law.194
In regard to Islamic law, if the parties provide that Islamic law applies, but
do not indicate whether they intended to be bound by the laws of a specific
country governed by Islamic law, classical Islamic law, or a particular
school of Islamic law, courts can examine the contract terms to find which
area of Islamic law the parties intended to apply. In addition, this Section
provides for a public policy exception.195 Specifically, if application of the
190
See Nat’l Grp. Commc’n & Computers v. Lucent Tech. Int’l, 331 F. Supp. 2d 290, 294-98 (D. N.J.
2004).
191
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
192
Id.
193
Id. at § 187
194
Id. at § 187 cmt. a.
195
Id. at § 187 (2)(b).
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chosen law violates the fundamental public policy of a state, which has a
greater interest in the action, the law shall not apply.196 There are indeed
instances where application of Islamic law in American courts would lead
to a result contrary to the fundamental public policy of the United States.
Accordingly, this section exempts the application of Islamic law where it
runs counter to the public policy of the United States.
IV.

A Solution: Islamic Arbitration

Islamic law is currently one of the top three major legal systems in
the world.197 Its application in U.S. courts has been slow, at best, due to
constitutional issues and instances of social and institutional prejudice.198
Nonetheless there are still parties in the United States as well as
internationally that seek to have their disputes adjudicated within the U.S.
under Sharia law. A solution to this issue has slowly been developing
under the umbrella of Islamic arbitration. Indeed, Islamic law has a long
history of arbitration, or tahkim, which dates back to pre-Islamic time when
tribal leaders conducted arbitration.199 Religious arbitration tribunals
already exist, such as the Beth din, the Jewish rabbinical arbitration
court.200 Notwithstanding, some argue that enforcement of religious
arbitration is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment; although courts have held that enforcing an award rendered
by the Beth din does not require entangling themselves in religion by
addressing the underlying merits of the case.201
Arbitration is a mode of resolving disputes, which allows parties to
choose a particular law to apply, and to have their issues resolved privately,
outside of the court system.202 It is conducted by arbitration tribunals,
which have jurisdiction once parties submit to their jurisdiction pursuant to
a valid arbitration clause in their contract.203 Often, parties submit to

196

Id.
See Faisal Kutty, The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 565, 566 (2006).
198
Id. at 568 (noting that there is a view in the United States that Islamic law is unsophisticated and
inherently defective).
199
Id. at 589.
200
See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1243 (2011).
201
See id. at 1244; see also Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343, 354 (D.C. Cir.
2005); Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1113 (D. Colo. 1999); Elmora
Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 731 (N.J. 1991).
202
See, e.g., Kutty, supra note 197, at 569.
203
See id.
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arbitration because it is faster and less expensive than the traditional
litigation route and allows greater flexibility regarding choice of law.204
The process of establishing Islamic arbitration in the United States
has already begun, and the Fiqh Council of North America is one such
example.205 This organization provides determinations based on Islamic
legal issues and is responsible for appointing arbitrators and confirming
that the arbitrators’ decisions comply with Islamic law.206 Moreover, the
Council of Masajid of the United States resolved to establish Islamic
arbitration tribunals in numerous large metropolitan areas in the United
States, although none have been established to date.207
The development of Islamic arbitration will not lead to rulings
contrary to public policy because courts have the mechanisms to vacate
arbitration awards in such cases.208 The Supreme Court of the United
States has even stated that “‘[t]he public’s interests in confining the scope
of private agreements to which it is not a party will go unrepresented unless
the judiciary takes account of those interests when it considers whether to
enforce such agreements,’” explaining that awards contrary to public policy
are void.209 Therefore, vacatur can serve as a check on religious arbitration.
Religious arbitration tribunals have been successful in the Jewish
community. If the Muslim community models arbitration tribunals after
examples such as the Beth din, there is no reason to believe that Islamic
arbitration tribunals will not be successful as well. The mold has already
been set. In 1925, written arbitration agreements were made valid by the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).210
There are various grounds under which an arbitration award may be
vacated, both under the FAA and state arbitration statutes. Two of these
grounds are where a tribunal failed to follow due process and where an
award violates public policy.211
204

See id. at 560-570.
Helfand, supra note 200, at 1250.
Id.
207
Id. (discussing the importance to Muslims of establishing Islamic arbitration tribunals and giving the
example of a recent fatwa issued by the Fiqh Council stating that Muslims must try to resolve disputes
according to Islamic law).
208
Id. at 1256.
209
Id.; but see id. (“the grounds on which a court can vacate or modify an arbitration award are
generally limited by statute to cases where the court finds ‘that the rights of the party were prejudiced
by corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award; partiality of an arbitrator; that the rights of
the arbitrator exceeded his power or failed to make a final and definite award; or a procedural failure
was not waived.’”).
210
See Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim Religious
Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J. L. & RELIGION 379, 388 (2009-2010) (FAA
provision) (“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”).
211
Id. at 390.
205
206
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Regarding the due process ground, a court will want to confirm that
the arbitration comports with the basic requirements of fairness and due
process, and that the parties entered the arbitration knowingly and
voluntarily.212 There are various procedural routes that arbitrators in
Jewish tribunals will take and these different roads are set out in advance,
so that the parties know what to expect.213 Interestingly, a beth din may
apply only Jewish law, or in the alternative, a combination of Jewish and
secular law.214 An example of where public policy and Jewish law conflict
is in cases where the beth din have refused a party the right to a lawyer.215
In such a case, American courts will vacate the award.216 Jewish law
discourages the use of lawyers because they are seen as pursuing their
client’s case only and not justice as a whole in the case.217 Of course, this
Jewish law is in direct conflict with the core of the American legal system,
where representation by an attorney is almost a fundamental right.218
Regarding the public policy ground, courts will vacate a beth din
award if the award is contrary to public policy or “irrational.”219 In
addition, courts have determined some issues as non-justiciable by beth
dins because of public policy, such as wills, child support, and custody.220
However, if a beth din does make a ruling on a child custody case, and the
court finds that it is in the best interest of the child, the order will not be
vacated.221
The beth din mold can be applied to Islamic arbitration tribunals.222
If the Islamic tribunals structure themselves similarly to beth dins, where
parties can voluntarily agree to bring their cases to the Islamic tribunals,223
where the tribunals set basic ground rules,224 where the ground rules are

212

Id. at 393.
Bambach, supra note 210, at 393-394 (“arbitrations can take various procedural forms, including
‘compromise or settlement related to Jewish law (p’shara korva l’din),’ or a hearing ‘either according
to Jewish law as it is understood by the arbitrators (din torah) or compromise (p’shara) alone.”).
214
Id. at 394.
215
Id. at 395.
216
Id.
217
Id. (noting that under Jewish law, lawyers are “depicted in halachic sources as . . . pursuing only
[their] client’s cases, not pursuing justice itself, in conflict with the Biblical commandment ‘tzedek
tzedek tirdof’ –meaning justice, justice, thou shalt pursue.”)
218
See id.
219
Id. at 399.
220
Id. (noting that most states argue that states’ parens patriae role cannot be assumed).
221
Id. at 399-400.
222
Id. at 403.
223
Id. at 406 (explaining that a voluntary agreement for arbitration is a requirement for civil courts to
review the agreements and that the arbitration agreements should always be in writing and be clear
about what is going to be arbitrated).
224
Id. at 408 (stating that there are many different schools of thought and interpretation of Islamic law,
and the tribunals should set ground rules for how to deal with this inherent issue that will come up).
213
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followed,225 and where awards are not against public policy or irrational,
Muslims may be successful in having their claims adjudicated by an
Islamic arbitral tribunal pursuant to Islamic law.226
Conclusion
It is possible that the use of Islamic law in U.S. courts has been slow
to develop because Muslim immigration to the United States is relatively
new, only occurring in large numbers as of the 1960s.227 As more Muslims
come to the U.S., and the use of Islamic law and custom becomes more
widespread, hopefully U.S. courts will become more accustomed to
analyzing, applying, and enforcing Islamic law as a choice of law in private
contracts.
Islamic arbitration tribunals are another mechanism through which
parties can have their contracts and disputes resolved pursuant to Islamic
law. In this context, Jewish arbitration tribunals serve as a useful example
for future Islamic arbitration tribunals.228 As the use of Islamic arbitration,
or tahkim, grows in the U.S., the hope is that parties will increase their use
of such tribunals and U.S. courts will become accustomed to enforcing
arbitral awards rendered by such tribunals.

225
Id. at 409 (noting that arbitrators should not be biased in their decisions, which can happen in a small
community).
226
Id. at 410 (knowing that awards contrary to public policy or irrational will not be confirmed by the
courts, the tribunals should avoid deciding cases this way).
227
Id. at 381.
228
See id. at 411.
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